May 2026
PROBLEM
Elections run on yesterday’s rules and platforms don’t inspire trust among voters used to ordering dinner on an app and tracking a driver’s progress to their door. Doubts about our democracy emerge based on lack of public information and vote counting that seems slow in an era of tech-enabled immediacy.
Disinformation (designed to mislead) and misinformation (just wrong) are not new, but they are problems accelerated by social media and artificial intelligence. And that exacerbates historical trust challenges we have always had with elections conducted by 50 different states, using different machines, methods, and timeframes. And the 10,000+ local jurisdictions actually running those elections each bring their own equipment, staff, and resources to the task. So even within a single state, applying the same laws, the experience of voting—and the speed of counting—can vary significantly, creating openings that can easily get exploited by disinformation and misinformation efforts.
The vote count takes longer than we might feel like it should. Forty-four states, Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands permit the processing of absentee or mail-in ballots prior to Election Day. That means signature verification, sorting envelopes, rejecting improperly executed ballots, and preparing ballots for scanning. Of those 44, 33 states also allow pre-Election Day ballot scanning—as long as those votes aren’t tabulated so that a “count” can’t leak out.
Six other states don’t allow any pre-processing of ballots to begin until Election Day, although they start before the polls close. Two of those, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, are battlegrounds on which the outcome has hinged on what happens in the wee hours of the morning.
Add to that the lurch factor: a race’s trajectory may change so suddenly as precincts report in that people not steeped in the local process may find it hard to understand.
The Constitution specifically grants the responsibility for the “times, places, and manner of holding elections” to the states, “but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” And of the people TSF polled in Spring 2026, only 36 percent say the federal government should take a stronger role in running elections to ensure they are secure and free from fraud. States must do more.
IDEA
States should take steps to improve transparency without compromising election integrity, including to:
- Require secretaries of state to publish online in real time where the ballots are, including how many ballots have been mailed out, how many have been returned before Election Day, and then how many mailed ballots, in-person votes, and provisional ballots have been cast on Election Day. Publishing county- or precinct-level breakdowns alongside those totals would give voters a more granular picture of participation, making the overall count easier to follow and harder to misrepresent. Nevada has led the way with its VIVID (Visual Interface for Voter Information & Data) system, providing a statewide overview of mail-in ballot processing and data on in-person Election Day turnout.
- Require secretaries of state to publish in real time how many ballots have been pre-processed, and how many ballots have been scanned. Nevada’s VIVID system already does something close to this, publishing real-time statewide counts of how many ballots have been returned by voters and how many have been accepted, providing a running picture of where ballots are in the pipeline at any given moment.
- Mandate response times between local clerks and the secretary of state’s office. Clerks work for their local government, not the state, and some are quicker than others to share information. Mandatory response timelines ensure that the secretary of state’s office has timely information from all the state’s jurisdictions.
- Even without a law mandating transparency, state election officials can publish information about which local clerks are or are not sharing. Publishing that data publicly creates accountability even without enforcement, since clerks who haven’t reported stand out the moment the dashboard updates.
- Use blockchain technology to secure the Certificate of Ascertainment in presidential elections, creating a permanent, independently verifiable record that cannot be altered without detection. The Certificate of Ascertainment is, in effect, a state’s official declaration of who won its presidential election and which electors will cast its votes in the Electoral College. The 2022 Electoral Count Reform Act mandated that states introduce an additional security feature to ensure that certificates are authentic, but it left the specifics to the states. Nevada integrated blockchain technology into the certification process in 2024. In an environment where official documents have become targets of disinformation, authentication that doesn’t require trusting any single institution matters. Blockchain shifts the question from ‘trust us’ to ‘verify yourself.’
States should do everything they can to speed the count without compromising accuracy.
- Allow, and then sufficiently fund, localities to operate early in-person voting sites. Require them to stay open weekends and evenings for some period of time prior to Election Day. Some states and localities are already moving in this direction. In the 2024 general election, 28 States and D.C. required local jurisdictions to offer early in-person voting on the weekends leading up to Election Day. When New York mandated early voting in 2019, including weekend and evening voting, it provided localities with $10 million for operations and staffing. In Wisconsin, Republican-majority Washington County made over $150,000 available to help municipalities expand their early voting hours, and 90% of the county’s municipalities participated in 2024.
- Allow the full pre-processing and scanning of ballots. Make clear in law what that means: scan the barcode on the envelope of a mailed ballot, verify and compare the signature or ID number (whichever your state requires in verification) which also would allow ballot curing processes to begin for any ballots that are rejected, open mail ballot envelopes and flatten and stack ballots, duplicate any damaged or unreadable ballots, and, where machine tabulation equipment exists, scan into the machine—all without tabulating the vote.
- Support efforts to secure state and federal grant funding to help local governments modernize. Tools like ballot-marking devices, sorting machines, and new tabulators can improve accessibility, accuracy, and timeliness of returns. Congress provides grant funding for states to improve and modernize election administration through the Election Assistance Commission. Though states are the primary recipients of this funding, they have discretion to pass it on to localities, where most of the day-to-day work of election administration takes place. But that discretion means that funding to modernize local administration doesn’t always reach the localities that need it the most. State officials should work with localities to identify gaps and secure funding.
- Provide technical expertise to support local governments. One of the most important forms that expertise can take is training. Currently, 43 states provide access to state-level training for election officials, but only 27 states require participation. Washington State shows what mandatory certification looks like in practice: two staff members in each county must be certified through the Election Administrator Certification process, which includes a two-day class, an exam, and 40 hours of additional education. Supporting local governments working with civic tech startups on election transparency pilot programs is another avenue worth exploring.
- Cure rejected ballots via text message instead of in person. As a sovereign government, states have the authority to text a voter’s mobile phone, and states can allow signatures to be verified by a texted image. Since 2020, Colorado has enabled voters to cure signature or ID discrepancies via smartphone through its TXT2Cure Program. Over 33,000 Coloradans have benefitted from the program.
EXPECTED OUTCOME
Conducting a more transparent and speedier election is like repointing the bricks in the wall of democracy. It shores up what’s already there. With the exception of support for longer in-person voting sites, these measures do not expand voting rights. They enhance the conduct of elections.
Because these are largely administrative measures to combat distrust and dissatisfaction, and largely popular, (see our polling data below), many of these measures hold bipartisan appeal.
It’s hard to say what moment after voting begins that doubt can seep into people’s consciousness, or spread like an infection through media or AI responses, but we certainly have enough technological, partisan, Trumpian, and malign foreign actor influences that it’s time to act to shore up the bricks.
CONSIDERATIONS
Benefits:
In addition to enhancing trust in elections, these measures can contribute to a better functioning electoral ecosystem, helping to:
- Make election workers’ and volunteers’ jobs more attractive. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission reports 48 percent of jurisdictions nationwide faced significant challenges recruiting and retaining a sufficient number of poll workers for the 2024 general election. Transparency and speed can make their jobs easier and less stressful.
- Give elected and appointed leaders a news hook to talk to voters about elections, reminding them to:
- Vote, and perhaps preferably, vote early.
- Take care with their vote. For instance, the most common reason a ballot in an envelope is rejected is that a signature can’t be matched. Couples, for instance, might seal their votes and then sign the wrong envelope, or sign their partner’s envelope for them. Young people may have no or unclear signatures in our digital age.
Challenges
- Local clerks don’t work for the state. Getting their cooperation and compliance will be a matter of cordial and trustworthy communication, supportive actions and possibly funding, the accountability factor that a state-run public dashboard provides, and finally, law.
- Bad actors, disinformation, and misinformation. We live in an era of election deniers and agitators, some complicit media and social media outlets, foreign interference, and chatbots which studies show are wrong 45 to 60 percent of the time.
- The pitched battles now playing out in the courts over district lines, mail-in ballots, the Voting Rights Act, and other aspects of the election process.
The immense pressure on U.S. elections is all the more reason to engage on reforms that stand to improve trust.
POLLING*
The States Forum asked voters in March, and there’s broad support for election transparency measures and for policies that prioritize accuracy over speed.
- Real-time vote count tracking is the most popular transparency measure: 65% say seeing how many votes had been cast and counted would increase their confidence in local elections. By party, 58% of Democrats, 68% of Independents, and 71% of Republicans say this would increase confidence.
- 53% say the same for tracking where mailed ballots are physically in the process. By party, 55% of Democrats, 55% of Independents, and 51% of Republicans say this would increase confidence.
- On speed vs. accuracy in vote counting, only 12% prioritize speed alone. 38% say accuracy even if it takes longer, and 46% say both are equally important. When voters who said “both” are forced to choose, 76% pick accuracy.
- 65% of voters support pre-processing early mail ballots (opening envelopes, verifying signatures before Election Day). By party, 70% of Democrats, 71% of Independents, and 57% of Republicans support this.
- 60% say mailed ballots sent before Election Day but received after should still be counted. 32% say they should not. By party, 70% of Democrats, 68% of Independents, and 47% of Republicans say they should be counted. Republicans are essentially split (47-46).
FAQ:
Will any of these measures open elections up to more the kinds of unfounded allegations of voter fraud we have seen?
None of these measures change how people vote. Even curing a ballot with a signature texted from a mobile phone is just deploying commonly used technology to exercise an election official’s human judgment.
Are there any cybersecurity risks?
None of these measures expose the actual scanning or tabulation of votes to any increased risk of cyber-tampering. It’s possible that a Secretary of State’s website sharing information about the numbers of ballots anywhere in the process could be hacked, but that doesn’t impact the vote, it impacts public perception of the vote.
Some local governments are scanning actual ballots and putting them online or reporting ballots cast by party registration. Do those measures go too far? Or are they worth emulating?
Ada County, Idaho, is placing actual ballot scanned images online in an abundance of transparency, and voters who really want to make sure their ballot was scanned are making tiny marks to identify them. The Ballot Verifier does not publish the ballots until four to six weeks after the election.
Pasco County, Florida and other jurisdictions are putting votes by party registration online as they are cast, before the polls close. That does not reveal how a voter actually voted.
Neither approach reveals a voter’s identity. Both are worth a look.
Where can I find more information or support for these initiatives?
The National Conference of State Legislatures is a comprehensive resource on what states are doing to administer elections and what the courts are doing to their ability to administer elections.
The MIT Election Data and Science Lab aims to improve elections by collecting, analyzing, and sharing core data findings, as well as build relationships with election officials to apply new research. They may also want to study your state.
The U.S. Election Assistance Commission also provides resources on election administration, voting and election technology, as well as information on relevant grants available from the federal government.
*Polling data cited from a Data for Progress survey of 1,159 U.S. likely voters conducted May 1-4, 2026. The sample was weighted to be representative of likely voters by age, gender, education, race, geography, and recalled presidential vote. The margin of error is ±3 percentage points. For more information on methodology, visit dataforprogress.org/our-methodology.